[ClusterLabs] Two nodes cluster issue

Prasad, Shashank ssprasad at vanu.com
Tue Jul 25 00:13:01 EDT 2017


> I don't think that having a hook that bypass stonith is the right way….

 

The intention is NOT to bypass STONITH. STONITH shall always remain active, and an integral part of the cluster. The discussion is about bailing out of situations when the STONITH itself fails due to fencing agent failures, and how one can automate the process of bailing out.

 

All that the surviving nodes in the cluster need to be informed is that the failed node has indeed failed, and therefore the suggestion for a hook.

 

The hook (lets’ say: STONITH-Failure-Recovery-Hook) under discussion will only be fired when Fencing Agent fails. STONITH-Failure-Recovery-Hook is realized via a script. The "${CRM_alert_rsc}" , "${CRM_alert_task}",   "${CRM_alert_desc}"  "${CRM_alert_node}" in the Pacemaker Alert can use used to match up with STONITH resource and its failures, and invoke the STONITH-Failure-Recovery-Hook as appropriate.

 

I also agree with Klaus that a quorum device is a good strategy.

That needs 3rd node in the cluster. If such an option can be exercised, it should be.

 

Thanx.

 

 

 

From: Tomer Azran [mailto:tomer.azran at edp.co.il] 
Sent: Tuesday, July 25, 2017 3:00 AM
To: kwenning at redhat.com; Cluster Labs - All topics related to open-source clustering welcomed; Prasad, Shashank
Subject: RE: [ClusterLabs] Two nodes cluster issue

 

I tend to agree with Klaus – I don't think that having a hook that bypass stonith is the right way. It is better to not use stonith at all.

I think I will try to use an iScsi target on my qdevice and set SBD to use it.

I still don't understand why qdevice can't take the place SBD with shared storage; correct me if I'm wrong, but it looks like both of them are there for the same reason.

 

From: Klaus Wenninger [mailto:kwenning at redhat.com] 
Sent: Monday, July 24, 2017 9:01 PM
To: Cluster Labs - All topics related to open-source clustering welcomed <users at clusterlabs.org>; Prasad, Shashank <ssprasad at vanu.com>
Subject: Re: [ClusterLabs] Two nodes cluster issue

 

On 07/24/2017 07:32 PM, Prasad, Shashank wrote:

	Sometimes IPMI fence devices use shared power of the node, and it cannot be avoided.

	In such scenarios the HA cluster is NOT able to handle the power failure of a node, since the power is shared with its own fence device.

	The failure of IPMI based fencing can also exist due to other reasons also.

	 

	A failure to fence the failed node will cause cluster to be marked UNCLEAN.

	To get over it, the following command needs to be invoked on the surviving node.

	 

	pcs stonith confirm <failed_node_name> --force

	 

	This can be automated by hooking a recovery script, when the the Stonith resource ‘Timed Out’ event.

	To be more specific, the Pacemaker Alerts can be used for watch for Stonith timeouts and failures.

	In that script, all that’s essentially to be executed is the aforementioned command.


If I get you right here you can disable fencing then in the first place.
Actually quorum-based-watchdog-fencing is the way to do this in a
safe manner. This of course assumes you have a proper source for
quorum in your 2-node-setup with e.g. qdevice or using a shared
disk with sbd (not directly pacemaker quorum here but similar thing
handled inside sbd).



	Since the alerts are issued from ‘hacluster’ login, sudo permissions for ‘hacluster’ needs to be configured.

	 

	Thanx.

	 

	 

	From: Klaus Wenninger [mailto:kwenning at redhat.com <mailto:kwenning at redhat.com> ] 
	Sent: Monday, July 24, 2017 9:24 PM
	To: Kristián Feldsam; Cluster Labs - All topics related to open-source clustering welcomed
	Subject: Re: [ClusterLabs] Two nodes cluster issue

	 

	On 07/24/2017 05:37 PM, Kristián Feldsam wrote:

		I personally think that power off node by switched pdu is more safe, or not?

	
	True if that is working in you environment. If you can't do a physical setup
	where you aren't simultaneously loosing connection to both your node and
	the switch-device (or you just want to cover cases where that happens)
	you have to come up with something else.
	
	
	

	
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		On 24 Jul 2017, at 17:27, Klaus Wenninger <kwenning at redhat.com> wrote:

		 

		On 07/24/2017 05:15 PM, Tomer Azran wrote:

			I still don't understand why the qdevice concept doesn't help on this situation. Since the master node is down, I would expect the quorum to declare it as dead.

			Why doesn't it happens?

		
		That is not how quorum works. It just limits the decision-making to the quorate subset of the cluster.
		Still the unknown nodes are not sure to be down.
		That is why I suggested to have quorum-based watchdog-fencing with sbd.
		That would assure that within a certain time all nodes of the non-quorate part
		of the cluster are down.
		
		
		

		
		
		

		On Mon, Jul 24, 2017 at 4:15 PM +0300, "Dmitri Maziuk" <dmitri.maziuk at gmail.com <mailto:dmitri.maziuk at gmail.com> > wrote:

		On 2017-07-24 07:51, Tomer Azran wrote:
		> We don't have the ability to use it.
		> Is that the only solution?
		 
		No, but I'd recommend thinking about it first. Are you sure you will 
		care about your cluster working when your server room is on fire? 'Cause 
		unless you have halon suppression, your server room is a complete 
		write-off anyway. (Think water from sprinklers hitting rich chunky volts 
		in the servers.)
		 
		Dima
		 
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		-- 
		Klaus Wenninger
		 
		Senior Software Engineer, EMEA ENG Openstack Infrastructure
		 
		Red Hat
		 
		kwenning at redhat.com <mailto:kwenning at redhat.com>    

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